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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
This paper addresses the problem of targeting in the system of disability benefits in Russia. The in-
terest to the topic is caused by the important role played by disability benefits in the national social 
security system. Over the last 15 years Russia has faced a visible growth of the number of individu-
als receiving disability pensions, which at the first sight may be seen as an evidence of deteriorating 
health conditions of the country population. However, some recent studies of disability develop-
ment around the world suggest that there exists a relationship between the number registered recipi-
ents of disability benefits and other indicators, such as generosity of provided benefits in compari-
son with other available sources of incomes in the economy, unemployment level, or stringency of 
requirements to the applicants. At the same time, measurement of disabled population can not be 
seen as a trivial task: obtained estimates may vary significantly depending on the selected approach. 
Available estimates show that usage of government statistics on the recipients of disability benefits 
results in significant underestimation of disability comparing to the approaches based on the analy-
sis of functional limitations.  
It is therefore unclear whether observed growth of benefit recipients in Russia truly reflects the 
changes in the population health. If this is not the case, it would be interesting to find a better ex-
planation for this trend: could the changes be caused by alterations in the legislation, availability of 
easy ways to benefit fraud, changing take-up rates, or simultaneous contribution of these reasons? 
Given all these problems, the central question of the research is to define how accurately the system 
allocates money to the targeted recipients, and whether individuals registered with the government 
agencies are the same as the ones experiencing restrictions in their regular functions and daily ac-
tivities.  
Conducted study of social security for disabled population in Russia and comparison of disability 
pensions to other types of social benefits has shown that the former have a number of significant 
advantages in terms of benefit amounts, eligibility, application procedures and maintenance of 
status in the system. Therefore, the main hypothesis of the paper states that the system does not 
provide sufficiently accurate targeting, and there exist numerous discrepancies between individual 
health condition and status within the system of state disability benefits. To test this hypothesis, the 
paper distinguishes between four groups of individuals. The first two groups comprise individuals 
fully complying with system requirements: healthy who do not receive disability benefits and bene-
fit recipients in poor health. The other two groups are associated with inaccurate targeting in the 
system: they include relatively healthy recipients of disability pensions in and individuals with bed 
health who are not registered with the system.  
Estimation of targeting accuracy conducted based on the data of the Russian Longitudinal Monitor-
ing Survey (RLMS) has shown that the rate of discrepancies in the system may amount to 13%, and 
2.4% in this number are the cases of benefit fraud. This means that more than 50% of individuals 
receiving disability benefits in terms of health conditions can not be differentiated from the rest of 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
5
adult population. The accuracy of targeting varies with age groups: the most accurate targeting is 
provided for younger groups, the difference between healthy and disabled gradually disappears with 
age, and after the statutory retirement age old-age and disability pension can be considered as a vol-
untary trade-off. Based on the identified relationship between disability and retirement, we can say 
that disability benefits play a distorting role and substitute for early retirement. Introduction of 
means-tested system at least for the part of benefits that is not funded on insurance principles, as 
well as introduction of policies that encourage people with disabilities to work and to stop paying 
benefits once some level of income is achieved might correct this problem. 
It also has been shown that non-participation is associated with lower levels of education. This out-
come implies the need to simplify existing application procedures and to improve the flows of in-
formation in the system for the benefit of less educated individuals. Emphasis on disability policies 
that are aimed at provision of accommodation for disabled to work, development of infrastructure, 
rehabilitation measures (including psychological adjustment) rather than just monetary benefits can 
also be beneficial for this group. These measures would provide disabled population with more op-
tions to get sufficient income and would reduce the psychological and social burden of being dis-
abled. As a result, the rate of applications for disability benefits would fall, the remaining amount 
would allow to increase payments to the fewer severely disabled individuals. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The problem of disability benefits is important for policy making in Russia for several reasons. 
First, national disability rates have grown significantly since the beginning of social security re-
forms in the early 90s. In 2003 the number of disabled people increased by almost 30% in compari-
son with 1985, amounting to 4.4 million or about 3% of the country population. The disability inci-
dence also increased from 6.15 to 8.25 individuals pro mille recognized as disabled respectively in 
1991 and 2004 (Socialnoe polojenie i uroven' jizni naselenia Rossii, 2004). Because of the fore-
casted population ageing, it seems likely that the proportion of disability pensioners in the total 
population will continue to rise. Second, funding of disability benefits represent considerable budg-
etary concern, and even under ongoing reform of social security system disability pensions are to a 
large degree funded on a pay-as-you-go basis. Third, disability rates become increasingly important 
for developing insurance markets, as understanding of disability risks is essential for design and 
pricing of insurance products. Finally, both state and private insurers need to know the extent to 
which today's high disability rates reflect true ill-health, as opposed to seeking for additional in-
come. 
The last argument draws attention to the issue which is central for this paper: relationship between 
desire people have to apply for social benefits and various factors defining personal and social con-
text, such as availability of income sources, social and psychological profiles of individuals facing 
social security system, or stringency of system requirements to successful applicants. Different 
combinations of these factors may result in benefit fraud in one case, or in voluntary refuse from 
application for benefits by someone with disability in another. Cases like these create a challenge to 
any system of disability benefits that is expected to provide accurate targeting and efficient preven-
tion of fraud, but apparently both problems are not resolved within the current system in Russia.  
This paper addresses the problem of mismatch between officially recognized disability status and 
actual health conditions of Russian population. The main objective is to evaluate the accuracy of 
disability benefits targeting, to investigate factors that determine individual behavior leading to the 
inconsistency between degree of actual health damage and status within social security system, and 
to elaborate policy recommendations to improve targeting in the system.  
The research focuses on three groups of individuals that arise from comparison of actual health 
conditions and status in the system of disability benefits:  
• complying — those whose health conditions correspond to the status in the system, either 
healthy or disabled;  
• not participating — those who do not receive disability benefits in spite of poor health that al-
lows to classify them as disabled;  
• abusing — those in reasonably good health, yet registered with the system and receiving dis-
ability benefits. 
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Members of the last two groups correspond to the two types of targeting deficiencies in the system: 
benefit fraud and rejection of participation. It is suggested that in the majority of cases these defi-
ciencies can be attributed to the deficiencies of social security system that does not impede deviant 
behavior among individuals. Investigation of individual behavior patterns would allow to identify 
the shortcomings of existing system and to elaborate suggestions for improvement of targeting. The 
main hypotheses of this research were formulated as follows:  
(1) The existing system of benefit allocation does not provide sufficiently accurate targeting.  
(2) Disabled population is a complex phenomenon affected by various economic, social and psy-
chological factors. Numeric estimates of this population may differ significantly depending on the 
adopted definition, such as registration in the social security system, estimated health conditions or 
self-reported disability. Disability determinants also vary with selected approach. 
(3) The social security system can be regarded as considerable supplementary source of income in 
unfavorable economic conditions. This means that some people tend to seek disability status even 
when their actual state of health allows labor force participation. Therefore, low-income individuals 
having no support from other members of the household will be more likely to abuse the system. 
System abusers are also more likely to have unfavorable employment histories, such as long unem-
ployment spells or lasting wage arrears.  
(4) Individuals are more likely to refuse from participation when higher transaction costs are associ-
ated with application to the social security agency. Hence, this type of behavior should be more dis-
tinctive to the residents of rural areas and settlements with lower degree of infrastructure develop-
ment. Moreover, people with serious health problems may deliberately avoid application to the so-
cial security agencies that is associated with high transaction and moral costs, even when they do 
not have sufficient alternative sources of income. It is also more difficult for severely disabled peo-
ple to go through administrative procedures, as a result adverse selection takes place. 
(5) Both abusing and refusing individuals are more likely to change their status in the disability sys-
tem rather than those whose registered degree of disability is consistent with actual health condi-
tions. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Research on disability relevant for this paper covers both theoretical models and empirical results, 
including Maki (1993), Kreider and Riphahn (2000), and Haveman et al. (1991). These studies 
mainly address the issues of relationship between availability and accessible amounts of disability 
benefits, measures of the health status, and labor participation rates for different groups of individu-
als. From this stream of research we do know that disability rates vary considerably over time, and 
that there is even more variation among the underlying causes of being disabled. In addition, there 
exist a causal relationship between search for disability benefits and the general economic condi-
tions. During economic decline, many individuals at risk of losing employment or suffering income 
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decrease can be expected to seek disability support, even if the actual health condition might allow 
continuing labor force participation. Conversely, individuals may tend to return to labor force as 
conditions improve, especially if the recovery leads to a real, positive influence on health, either 
because of improved medical care or for psychological reasons. 
A number of papers address the issue of mismatch and inaccurate targeting of social security pay-
ments to disabled population. Bound et al. (2004) discuss the importance of relationship between 
strictness of eligibility criteria in the system of disability benefits and two risks the systems are fac-
ing: the risk of having disabled people who do not receive benefits and the risk of awarding benefits 
to people who are able to work. Bound and Burkhauser (1999) provide a detailed overview of re-
search that considered the impact of screening procedures on application rates and labor force par-
ticipation, including the problem of moral hazard and work disincentives provided by social secu-
rity benefits. Among existing screening models Parsons (1999) should be mentioned. To study tar-
geting in the US disability insurance system, he develops a utility based model of self-screening in 
the process of eligibility determination. Empirical estimation of the model supports hypothesis of 
inverse relationship between the stringency of administrative procedures and the application rates.  
An important implication for evaluation of targeting accuracy can be derived from a drastically new 
view of disabled populations introduced by the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990), as dis-
cussed by Burkhauser and Daly (2002). This approach is challenging a traditional attitude according 
to which people with disabilities are not expected to work. In contrast, the new viewpoint argues 
that nonworking disabled population arises from lack of appropriate arrangements in the society 
that prevents these people from employment rather than intrinsic nature of disability. Under such 
approach, the role of disability benefits in general is significantly reduced, as a large share of dis-
abled people come under jurisdiction of regular unemployment or welfare benefits when needed, 
just as others without any health problems do. The importance of targeting issue in this case is 
minimized, since the difference in social security treatment of disabled and healthy population is 
gradually eliminated.  
Apart from the issue of targeting, an important behavioral aspect of disability benefits is relation-
ship between generosity of payments and labor supply of recipients. Leonard (1979) finds that the 
growth of social security payments explained almost 50% of decline in labor force participation of 
US middle age males in the middle of the 20th century. We also know that the generosity of disabil-
ity system can have a serious impact on the labor markets from Gruber (2000) who uses Canadian 
data and policy specifics to show that increasing amounts of benefits lead to significant declines of 
the labor participation rates and labor supply.  
Estimation of national disabled population, description of disability policies and trends across dif-
ferent countries is considered in another group of studies. The two papers of particular interest for 
this project that expand the research of disability into transitional countries are Metts (2000) and 
Hoopendardner (2001). These are both policy-oriented papers that address the magnitude of disabil-
ity problem across countries and existing policies. Unfortunately, lack of the systematic data does 
not allow the authors to elaborate further on the empirical model for disability in transition. How-
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ever, both papers also recognize disability issue as a combination of social, personal and environ-
mental aspects and provide an extensive statistical coverage of the problem, implemented policy 
analysis, and problematic issues for a range of countries. 
The focus on Russia suggested for this paper is beneficial due to clear disability categorizations in 
the country's comprehensive social security system that reveals behavioral responses to shifts in the 
underlying environment. The data of ongoing RLMS survey of Russian households provides an op-
portunity to consider the dynamics of disability, enabling us to focus on the influence of factors 
other than health status on the individual likelihood of obtaining a state disability pension. Some 
results of disability risk estimation based on RLMS survey are presented by Becker and 
Merkuryeva (2003). They include the multinomial analysis of the determinants of disability risks in 
Russia, estimates of the probability of moving between disability statuses. This paper develops pre-
vious work, allowing to relate the results obtained for the determinants of transition probabilities 
between disability statuses, and to provide the ground for a systematic assessment of targeting.  
3. SOCIAL SECURITY FOR DISABLED IN RUSSIA 
3.1. The system of disability benefits 
The main part of disability benefits in Russia is provided in the form of labor disability pensions 
through the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation. Apart from disability pensions which comprise 
the main part of social security for disabled people, there exists a complicated system of payments 
for industrial accident injuries and temporary loss of ability to work administered by two other non-
budget funds — Social Security Fund and Compulsory Medical Insurance Funds. The system pro-
vides a whole range of payments for those who are not eligible for labor disability pension, such as 
disability pensions to civil servants, social pensions to disabled without employment record and dis-
abled from childhood. Yet, recipients of labor disability pension comprise the majority of official 
disabled population (Fig. 1); therefore this group is primarily addressed in the research hereafter.  
(3) — 8% 
(2) — 12% 
 
(1) — 65%
(4) — 12%
(5) — 3%
(1) — Labor disability 
pensions
(2) — Civil disability 
pensions 
(3) — Social pensions to 
disabled without 
employment record 
(4) — Social pensions to 
disabled from childhood 
(5) — Social pensions to 
disabled children 
 
Fig. 1. Disability pensions in Russia: distribution of recipients. Source of data: NOBUS, 2003 
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The Law on Labor Pensions defines three categories of disability pension recipients depending on 
the degree of health damage, Category III corresponding to the most severe disability1. A special 
commission of medical experts defines disability status based on the statement from applicant's 
medical institution. It is reconsidered every two years for the Category III, and annually for Catego-
ries I and II, except for those individuals who have reached official retirement age or have irreversi-
ble anatomical defects. 
The amount of pension is determined from combined information on the category of disability and 
earnings history. Starting from 2002, labor disability pension consists of three parts replicating the 
old-age labor pensions: base (minimal amount equal for all recipients), insurance (linked to individual 
earnings and employment record), and funded (paid from individual accumulated reserve). The size of 
base disability pension is set at the level of old-age base pension for the recipients of category 2; re-
cipients of the 3rd and 1st category receive respectively 200 and 50% of the base old-age pension.  
The benefits were determined differently prior to 2002 reform. Although these changes did not shift 
significantly the balance between various social security benefits, they are important to discuss 
here, as significant part of available data refers to pre-reform period. Before 2002, the amount of 
disability pension was set at 75% of individual pensionable earnings for Categories II and III, and at 
30% of earnings for the first category. In both systems, if information on earnings was not avail-
able, the recipient received a minimum disability pension, which is equal to the minimum old-age 
pension for those in Categories II and III, and 2/3 of the minimum old-age pension for the first 
category (base old-age pension after 2002). In any case, disability pension could not exceed the 
maximum amount of old-age pension. The amount of disability pension did not depend on the num-
ber of years worked in case of an on-the-job injury, or for individuals under 20 years old. In all 
other cases, a minimum employment qualification period was required, depending on the age. There 
are special cases when different calculation approaches are applied, including military, incomplete 
working period, and immigrants.  
In addition to the general pension amount, up to January 2005 the system provided all disabled peo-
ple with supplementary in-kind benefits. The most valuable and popular benefits included the rights 
to obtain free medicines, free transportation, and discounts on utilities payments; altogether these 
provisions nearly doubled real incomes of the disability pensioners (Maleva et al., 1999).  
3.2. Disability benefits in comparison with other sources of social security 
It should be emphasized that the size of income gained in form of disability pension and accompa-
nying in-kind benefits is an important addition to the recipient's budget. It is also quite important 
                                                 
1 Categories of limitation to vital activity are introduced by the Federal Law on Social Security for Disabled People 
(Federalnyi zakon "O socialnoi zaschite invalidov v RF"). Based on the category of limitation, three groups of disability 
are identified to be granted by medical expertise, providing one-to-one match between the two notions. However, the 
numbering for disability groups is inverse (group 1 corresponds to the most severe disability). Although the term 
"groups" is used more often, in this work we refer to the "categories", mainly because labor disability pensions are as-
signed based on the categories rather than groups (Federalnyi zakon "O trudovyh pensiah v RF"). 
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comparing to other benefits that can be received within social security system. Some information on 
the relative amounts of social security payments and minimal social guarantees provided in 2000 
and 2003 is shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Monthly amounts of social security benefits and living standards in Russia 
Indicator (rubles) 2000 2003 
Minimal wage 83.5 450 
Average wage  2225.3 5493.3 
Minimal pensions:   
 old-age 108.4 522.38 
 disability, cat. I 72.3 261.2 
 disability, cat. II 108.4 522.38 
 disability, cat. III 216.8 1044.8 
Minimal retiree subsistence level 909 1605 
Unemployment benefits (min/max) 242/1210 422/2112 
Monthly allowance for children under 1.5 y.o. 167 500 
Minimal scholarship for the students of state universities 167 200 
Source: Rossiyskiy statisticheskiy ejegodnik (2001–2005). 
As it is seen from the table, eligibility for the third category of disability payments can bring a sig-
nificant gain compared with, for instance, regular old-age pension, even in terms of monetary bene-
fits taken without consideration of in-kind supplements. This gap becomes even larger when the 
special privileges are taken into account. Moreover, for an individual who used to be employed in 
the informal sector or received shadow wage payment, disability pension may become a more reli-
able source of social security comparing to other types of payments that have stronger linkage to the 
earnings history. While the amounts of benefit seem to be quite attractive, actual probability of be-
ing caught with falsified benefit is perceived as extremely low. Disability of the 3rd category is as-
signed for 2 years, 2nd and 1st — for one year, after which medical reexamination is required. There-
fore, registration of disability leads to automatic and safe receipt of benefits for another year or two. 
The penalty in case of cheat revelation theoretically can be rather severe: falsification might imply 
bribery of a medical expert, which is a criminal offence in Russia making both parties involved re-
sponsible. However, there are virtually no cases of this law enforcement in case of disability bene-
fits, and consequently expected loss is negligibly low. The worst thing that can actually happen af-
terwards is rejection of status prolongation. 
Probably the most natural alternative of disability benefits for an individual who faces problems in 
the labor market would be unemployment status. In general case recognition of disability status 
does not prevent an individual from receiving unemployment benefits, therefore there is no need for 
a choice between mutually exclusive options, and disability pension can be viewed as a comple-
mentary source of income in addition to unemployment benefits. As the amount of unemployment 
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benefits can not be determined without information on the earning history of a specific individual, 
Table 1 shows only minimum and maximum statutory amounts; exact relationship between allow-
able unemployment and disability payments can only be computed on case by case basis. Therefore, 
comparison between the amounts of disability and unemployment benefits requires more careful 
consideration that would take into account a number of factors, such as belonging to formal or in-
formal sector, etc.  
Yet, there are a number of system specific features allowing for certain comparisons. The first seri-
ous difference between the two types of benefits is eligibility and potential duration of payments. 
Amount of unemployment benefits is determined based on the information on average individual 
earnings within three months preceding the loss of employment, while disability status does not re-
quire being employed directly before application for benefits and therefore is more accessible for 
individuals with broken earnings records. Standard duration of unemployment status corresponds to 
the minimal duration of disability status between two medical reexaminations (12 months). How-
ever, maximum period of unemployment benefits payment can not exceed 24 out of any uninter-
rupted 36 months, while disability status can be prolonged without any limits, and in some cases 
even without reexamination. 
Another considerable difference is in the scale of allowable benefits. The wage to benefit ratio for 
unemployment benefits is set at regressive scale constituting 75% in the first 3 months of unem-
ployment period, 60% in the following 4 months, and only 45% afterwards in the first year of pay-
ments; the second 12 months period provides merely the minimum payment equal to 30% of the 
regional minimal subsistence level (Federalnyi zakon "O zaniatosti naselenia v RF"). In all periods 
there are upper and lower limits of benefit amounts. Until recently introduced 2005 amendments to 
legislation that probably are not relevant for this paper2, the maximum was set at the level of re-
gional minimal subsistence level, the minimum after 6 months of benefit receipt at 30% of regional 
minimal subsistence level (but not less than 100 rubles monthly). The figures shown in Table 1 re-
veal that there is only 5 times difference between maximum and minimum amounts of unemploy-
ment benefits. This means that there is a severe binding constraint on the maximum size of unem-
ployment benefits: it can never be higher than a relatively small statutory amount (2880 rubles, or 
around 100 USD in 2006), and within 7 months of unemployment it goes down to 1296 rubles  
(45 USD) at the very best case. As the values of disability benefits do not decrease over time, this 
aspect of the system can be viewed as another advantage of disability over unemployment status. 
Finally, the status of disabled does not necessitate any additional activities or communications with 
the government structures to be taken within a period between two medical examinations, which is 
at least one year. Meanwhile, being registered as unemployed with the state agency normally re-
quires regular visits to the local office, a lot of paper work, passing job interviews or participation in 
various training programs, etc. Incompliance with any of these requirements leads to the termina-
tion of status and benefits, making positions of unemployed more vulnerable and unstable. 
                                                 
2 Starting from 2005, the federal government is annually setting minimum and maximum limits for unemployment 
benefits. 
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3.3. Disability benefits as a part of household income 
In addition to the size of minimal social guarantees it is interesting to consider the actual contribu-
tion of the main social security payments into individual and household budgets (Table 2). Al-
though according to the obtained estimates average size of disability pension is lower than the 
amount of old-age pension, the minimal values show that there are certain advantages of disability 
pensions for low income recipients. It should be kept in mind that eligibility requirements to old-age 
pension recipients (age and length of employment record) are much more restrictive in terms of fal-
sification opportunities than those to the recipients of disability pensions (health conditions deter-
mined by potentially corrupt medical institution). The same is true in case of other social benefits 
that can be relatively hard to access. Consequently, disability pensions become a comparatively ac-
cessible and significant in size type of support. Therefore, as in the case with minimal statutory set 
amounts, we are facing relative attractiveness of disability pensions in the overall system. In gen-
eral, disability pensions amount to 86% of individual income of the recipients (more precisely, 71 to 
92% depending on the disability category), although their contribution to the combined income of 
all household members is lower than those of other pension types. 
Table 2. The contribution of pensions and social allowances into household budgets 
Indicator (RUR) Average Min Share of individual income 
Share of household 
income 
Pensions:     
old-age  1691 200 0.89 0.26 
disability (I category) 1084 460 0.71 0.13 
disability (II category) 1396 500 0.92 0.17 
disability (III category) 1603 500 0.87 0.17 
loss of provider 974 345 0.90 0.43 
social pensions 1051 180 0.91 0.31 
Allowances:     
to the citizens who suffered from radiation 142 20 0.21 0.02 
to children under 1,5 y.o. 539 50 0.66 0.06 
to children under 16 (18) y.o. 91 4 0.92 0.03 
to disabled children 680 50 0.76 0.07 
Unemployment benefits 2154 144 0.96 0.33 
Scholarship in state universities 236 26 0.85 0.03 
Source of data: NOBUS, 2003 
In-kind benefits that until recently were fully available to the disabled individuals can also be 
evaluated in terms of overall contribution to the household income. The most popular are the dis-
counts for utilities (over 80% of eligible respondents used them within 3 months preceding to the 
survey) and telephone payments, subsidized public transport and medicine provision (Fig. 2). Less 
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popular but still important are property tax discounts, free medical services, purchases of private 
vehicles, etc. — the usage rates do not exceed 10% of eligible respondents, however, these are still 
very high rates given the durable nature of the benefits.  
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Utilities
payments
Local transport Free medicines Phone payments Suburban
transport
Intercity
transport  
Fig. 2. Usage of selected in-kind benefits provided to the recipients of disability pensions (% to the number of 
eligible respondents).  
Source of data: NOBUS, 2003 
4. ESTIMATION OF TARGETING ACCURACY 
4.1. Data and identification of disabled population 
The paper uses the data of Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) to evaluate the accu-
racy of targeting in the disability benefits system and identify the factors that determine discrep-
ancies between official and actual health statuses of the individual respondents. There are few 
ways to identify disabled individuals from RLMS dataset. The difficulties encountered in the es-
timation of disabled population are discussed by Ravaud et al. (2002) who suggest application of 
five different approaches to define disabled population from the data of INSEE survey: adminis-
trative registration, self-reporting of individuals, restriction of activity, functional limitations and 
need of assistance. The authors recognize disability as a complicated social phenomenon that can 
not be measured exactly, influenced among all by social, cultural and economic factors. Depend-
ing on the approach, the estimates of disability prevalence vary from 21.1 to 5.2% of adult sam-
ple, the lowest being official recognition of disability status. For RLMS data three measurement 
approaches based on administrative registration, self-reporting and restriction of activity can be 
implemented. The following survey questions are used in this work to identify different types of 
disabled population: 
• administrative registration: respondent reported receiving state pension for disability (question 
74-2 of adult questionnaire); 
• self-reporting: respondent classified her primary occupation at the time of survey as "unable to 
work for health reasons, disabled" (question 90 of adult questionnaire); 
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• restriction of activity: a set of questions in the health section of adult questionnaire on individ-
ual ability to perform certain daily activities. This is a composite indicator discussed below in 
more details.  
The last approach is crucial for the purpose of this research, as it allows to estimate actual health 
conditions as opposed to the fact of disability benefits assignment. Potential problem of this re-
search is the accuracy of available data on the health status of the respondents. As the only way to 
assess health conditions is through self-reporting, there is a possibility that benefit abusers would 
provide biased information on their health conditions. In order to minimize the extent to which 
those individuals who already falsified their disability status would attempt to provide incorrect in-
formation in course of data collection, it is suggested to use indirect approach to the evaluation of 
physical conditions.  
RLMS provides three pieces of data on individual health status using different types of questions: 
first, direct questions on self-evaluation of health, second, questions designed to collect information 
on specific chronic illnesses and serious diseases experienced within the recent time period, and, 
third, questions on individual ability to perform certain basic functions required in everyday life. 
Generally the nature of the survey suggests that information on health evaluation should not be con-
sidered by the respondents as the most sensitive. In particular, RLMS covers a number of issues that 
might be more natural to conceal, such as information on employment, income and taxes, informal 
payments for medical services or attitudes to the current political system. Among all these issues 
that might be really kept to oneself, it seems rather unlikely that a respondent would be able to fol-
low a link between the questions on disability status and health conditions that are located in com-
pletely different sections of the questionnaire, and provide consistently falsified answers.  
However, the design of disability benefit system suggests that the first two measures used in RLMS 
(self-reported health and medical record) would be the most likely to incorporate falsified informa-
tion, as the disability status is most frequently granted in relationship with some serious illness. The 
underlying measures of physical functions, which do not appear directly in course of medical ex-
amination for benefit applicants, provide comparable information on the degree of health damage 
and cause less suspicion from the respondent. Therefore, this information can be used to generate 
implicit indicators of individual ability to function normally in everyday life and therefore increase 
reliability of the data. A crosscheck between different types of questions (e.g., illness vs physical 
functions) can also be used to explore the data accuracy.  
The construction of composite indicator measuring restriction of activity is based on five basic vital 
functions defined in accordance with social security regulations: self-service, mobility, orientation, 
communications, and behavior control. RLMS contains certain pieces of information on most of the 
functions with the answers ranked on 5-point scale from "absolutely not difficult" to "impossible". 
The correspondence between available survey data and required functions is shown in Table 3. 
Many of the available indicators are interrelated, and most are focused on the two primary functions 
— self-service and mobility. Although it is sometimes difficulty to classify certain questions, in 
general they provide sufficient information, especially for identification of the most severe group of 
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disabled. Availability of multiple questions can be regarded as another source of data reliability. 
Further in this section the number of indicators available from RLMS for a vital function 5:1∈i  is 
denoted as ki, and an individual answer score regarding the indicator ikj :1∈  for a vital function 
5:1∈i  as Aij. 
The measures of vital functions available from RLMS can be linked to the criteria used by the Of-
fices of Medical and Social Expertise to assign certain categories of disability in accordance with 
the current legislation (Joint Decree of the Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Health, 29 January 
1997, N 1/30). First, the legislation defines three degrees of distortion for each mentioned vital 
function (1 — partial distortion, 2 — ability to perform function with an aid of specific equipment 
or other people, 3 — complete loss of function). Second, each category of disability is defined ac-
cording to the individual ability to perform specific functions.  
Table 3. RLMS questions used to evaluate restriction to activity 
Vital function Survey questions 
Self-service Ability to take a shower, eat, put on clothes, brush hair, use bathroom, cooking 
Mobility Ability to run/walk 1 km/200 m, walk upstairs, carry weight, kneel, walk across room, sit 
for 2 hrs, stand up after sitting, stand up from a bad 
Orientation Ability to use the public transport, shopping 
Communications Eyesight, hearing, ability to use the phone 
Behavior control Ability to manage money 
In terms of RLMS answer codes for the questions on individual ability to perform specific tasks, the 
answers "impossible" and "very difficult, but possible" can represent the sufficiently high degree of 
vital function distortion to identify disabled population. In this case, two alternative measures can 
be suggested to attribute individuals to disabled population based on self-reported health status.  
A "weak" measure (W) would simply take the maximum distortion value for a complete set of the 
vital functions as an indicator (i.e., complete loss of ability to perform just one of the tasks will be 
enough for an individual to be classified as disabled). A weak measure can be determined both for 
the separate vital function and for a complete set of vital functions. In the first case this measure is 
computed as  
 ijkji AW i:1
max
∈
= , 5:1∈i . (1) 
An overall measure for the five vital functions can be obtained as 
 ijjiii AWW ,5:1 maxmax == ∈ . (2) 
This measure might intensify the degree of disability comparing to the actual state of affairs, as 
even severe distortion of merely one function might either be caused by misreporting or turn to be 
insufficient for proper classification of an individual who is absolutely healthy in all other respects. 
Therefore, alternative "strong" measure (S) can be based on an average for a set of indicators for 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
17
each function, allowing for more comprehensive account of the distortions, and also giving an op-
portunity to rank the extent of distortion:  
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For each individual both measures will give estimated health-based status in the system (healthy or 
disabled) that can be matched to the fact of disability pension receipt to identify possible mis-
matches. This results will further be used to evaluate the accuracy of benefit targeting.  
4.2. Estimation of disabled population and labor market histories 
In this work Round 11 of RLMS with adult sample size of 10 499 individuals was used for empiri-
cal estimation. The choice of this survey round referring to the year 2002 is explained with the fact 
that this was the most recent round containing appropriate information on health conditions and al-
lowing for another period of observations to follow transitions from disability status in the subse-
quent period (starting from round 12, different structure of health section was introduced, therefore 
information from 2003 and later could only be used for reference). 
As discussed in section 4.1, there are three possible ways to identify disabled individuals in RLMS. 
First, all those receiving disability benefits can be classified as actually disabled. Second, one of 
options provided to answer a survey question on the main occupation sounds as "Unable to work for 
health reasons, disabled" — this option can be used to identify individuals in bad health who for 
some reason do not receive a disability pension. Although this measure of self-reporting may be 
imperfect, as the question is not formulated directly enough to emphasize importance of physical or 
mental restrictions and include too many answer options that may be overlapping, we try to use it to 
provide some basis for comparison. Third, direct information on health conditions can be used to 
estimate physical ability. Discussion below is based on the comparison of disabled populations ob-
tainable with the first and the second methods.  
The number of individuals who report receiving state disability pension is around 4.3% of adult 
sample. However, less than one third of these individuals (1.3% of the surveyed respondents) con-
sidered being unable to work for health reasons (disabled) as their primary occupation at the mo-
ment of interview. Respectively, individuals reporting disability as the main occupation are much 
less numerous — 1.7% of the sample. Almost all of them receive either disability pension (in 75% 
of cases), or an old-age pension (9%). As the individuals beyond the statutory retirement age are 
eligible for any single type of pensions at their own choice (e.g., old-age, disability, pensions for 
civil servants, etc.), these cases might reflect the situations when benefits for old-age are higher than 
for disability. There are some 17% of self-reported disabled individuals who do not receive any 
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kind of pension despite stating that they can not work for health reasons. None of these individuals 
is employed, registered with state unemployment agency or obtaining additional qualification, sug-
gesting that these are individuals refusing form participation in social security system being actually 
unable to participate in the labor activities for health reasons. This group, representing around 0.3% 
of adult sample, can be used as a benchmark for the estimates of non-participating individuals.  
 Studying
2%
Disabled
31% 
Retired
47%
Housewife 
2%
Unemployed
4%
Employed
14% 
 
Fig. 3. Recipients of disability pensions by primary occupation, RLMS 2002 
The number of those who receive disability pension but do not consider being disabled as the pri-
mary occupation is very high amounting to about 70% of the benefit recipients. The distribution of 
these individuals is given in Fig. 3. Most of these individuals (47% of disability pension recipients) 
classify themselves as retired and not working, another large group is involved in various kinds of 
employment (14%). This fact, on the one hand, suggests that recipients of disability benefits are in 
relatively good shape and are ready to participate in various activities. On the other hand, it might 
support the hypothesis of benefit abuse.  
Another interesting feature of disability pension recipients is the patterns leading in and out of the 
disability status in the system. The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 4 that shows the 
history of individuals who received disability pensions in 2002 in terms of their primary occupa-
tions at different stages of the survey. The majority of recipients tend to stick to the system once 
they manage to access it: over 50% of 2002 pension recipients used to be in the system in previous 
year, and the vast majority (over 70%) does not quit within the next two years. Another huge group 
comprising at some stages up to 20% of 2002 benefit recipients are retired individuals. In fact, dis-
abled and retired might be difficult to distinguish, and the status might represent the result of volun-
tary rational choice. In other words, over 50% of the movers (those who change disability status be-
tween the two periods) come from the category of retired individuals. In all periods up to 2% clas-
sify themselves as disabled by primary occupation but do not receive benefits, either being dis-
missed from the system or unsuccessful in application or refusing from interactions with the system. 
The prospective of employment seems to be very sensitive to the experience of disability pension 
receipt: while almost 11% of the recipients used to work two years before obtaining the status, only 
4% returned to work two years after stopping being registered with the system. Meanwhile, the 
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highest rates of unemployment are observed 2 years before obtaining disability status, suggesting a 
gradual transition from being in the labor force to disability.  
Table 4. Primary occupation of 2002 disability pension recipients at different survey dates (% to the number of disabil-
ity pension recipients) 
Year 
Primary occupation 
2000 (t–2) 2001 (t–1) 2003 (t+1) 2004 (t+2) 
Disabled (received disability pension) 0.59 0.73 0.81 0.72 
Disabled (self-reported, did not receive 
disability pension) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Studying 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Retired 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.19 
Maternity/child leave 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Housewife 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Unemployed 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Employed 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.04 
Other 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
The relative risks of becoming disabled differ significantly in terms of the status in the labor market 
in the previous period. The overall probabilities of becoming disabled (both in terms of self-
reporting disabled as primary occupation or getting eligibility for disability pension) within the fol-
lowing year for representatives of different groups are given in Table 5.  
Table 5. Relative risks of becoming disabled by primary occupation 
Year Primary occupation in previous 
year 2003 2002 2001 2000 
Retired 0.039 0.027 0.027 0.021 
Unemployed 0.020 0.027 0.027 0.021 
Housewife 0.014 0.003 0.016 0.008 
Employed 0.008 0.011 0.009 0.009 
Maternity/child leave 0.006 0.007 0.000 0.000 
Studying 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Other 0.005 0.018 0.007 0.009 
Similar to the previously discussed case with the history of primary occupation of disabled indi-
viduals, retirees represent the most vulnerable group and have the highest rates of disability risks. 
This result is natural if we take into consideration that this is the oldest age group of surveyed indi-
viduals. It is more interesting to note that the next group by risk magnitude is unemployed respon-
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dents; in fact, for most of the periods the risks of becoming disabled is almost equal for retired and 
unemployed individuals. If we consider the category of unemployed jointly with the next one — 
housewives, who under some conditions can cover the same status in the labor market as unem-
ployment — this group becomes even riskier than the retirees. This outcome suggests that individu-
als without regular employment are more likely to apply for disability benefits, although causality 
can work differently for those who lost job due to ill health or any other reasons not related to the 
medical conditions. The most secure groups are represented by the students and women on mater-
nity leave or taking care of the young children who presumably comprise younger groups of popu-
lation and enjoy relatively good state of health.  
4.3. Estimation of inconsistencies 
According to the approach described in Section 4.1, two measures of health conditions were con-
structed for each of the five vital functions for both strong and weak criterion. Table 6 shows sam-
ple average values obtained for the two criteria. According to the suggested approach, health condi-
tions are slightly better when measured on the weak criterion, as poor results on one dimension are 
not offset by otherwise good state of health. Self-reported health is on average around one point 
worse (which makes a difference of almost 30%) for the recipients of disability pension and dis-
abled by main occupation comparing to the remaining part of the sample. However, the differences 
are not as pronounced as it could be expected, suggesting the presence of deviating individuals in 
both groups.  
Table 6. Estimated health conditions by vital functions 
Weak criterion 
(maximum value in the group  
of questions) 
Strong criterion 
(average value in the group  
of questions) 
Function 
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Self-service 2.51 2.52 1.61 1.75 1.81 1.26 
Mobility 3.50 3.53 2.02 2.57 2.54 1.52 
Orientation 2.87 2.73 1.83 2.68 2.54 1.70 
Communications 3.35 3.12 2.71 2.62 2.52 2.22 
Behavior control 1.84 1.72 1.28 1.84 1.72 1.28 
Overall criteria result 4.03 4.03 2.92 2.35 2.40 1.70 
The character of disability usually varies a lot depending on different social and demographic 
groups of the population, in particular with age and gender. To investigate how these patterns are 
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reflected by suggested criteria Table 7 provides the values of criteria differentiated by gender and 
three age groups: 40 and below, 41 through the statutory retirement age (55 for women and 60 for 
men) and after reaching the statutory retirement age. The results of Table 7 show gradual deteriora-
tion of health with aging: the values of criteria are increasing with age for all groups under consid-
eration, supporting consistency of the measures. It is seen that the relative differences between pre-
sumably healthy and disabled individuals are maximized for the first age group (reaching 40% for 
men below 41 disabled by primary occupation on weak criterion), while after retirement disabled 
become more comparable with those who are not (for example, only 10% difference for retired 
women receiving disability pensions). Suggestion that can be made from these results is that target-
ing works much better in young ages, while for older people distribution of benefits is not that di-
rectly linked to the health conditions.  
Table 7. Estimated health conditions by age and gender 
Weak criterion 
(maximum value in the group of questions) 
Strong criterion 
(average value in the group of questions) 
Age / gender group 
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40 and below 3.07 3.51 2.10 1.93 2.27 1.45 
41–54(59) 3.85 4.03 2.86 2.28 2.29 1.71 M
en
 
55(60) and above 4.56 4.50 3.83 2.51 2.66 1.70 
40 and below 3.38 3.32 2.45 1.99 2.00 1.60 
41–54(59) 4.06 4.34 3.20 2.57 2.69 2.00 
W
om
en
 
55(60) and above 4.61 4.82 4.14 2.57 2.75 1.94 
Overall criteria result 4.03 4.03 2.92 2.35 2.40 1.70 
Estimation of inconsistencies relies among other factors upon specified thresholds used to distin-
guish between healthy and disabled individuals. Here the values 5 corresponding to the complete 
loss of ability to perform one of the vital functions was selected as the most reasonable for weak 
criterion. Fig. 4 shows how the mismatch levels change depending on the selected threshold levels. 
It is seen from the graph that application of strong criterion at 2.2 threshold value would provide 
results relatively close to those obtained with the value 5 set for weak criterion; therefore, the value 
2.2 is used for strong criterion in further discussion. The patterns shown in Fig. 4 also resemble re-
action of individuals to the social security policy: when a government increases threshold value re-
quired for an individual to enter the system of benefits, the expected number of abusers rises, and 
the abstinence simultaneously reduce. Regardless of the criterion or selected thresholds, it is seen 
from the graph that the actual health differences are not perfectly captured by the policy of benefit 
allocation. 
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Inconsistencies between self-reported health conditions and status within the system of disability 
benefits computed for the entire sample are given in Table 8. Mainly due to the dominating healthy 
group, the majority of the respondents (altogether 86% of the sample) behave consistently in terms 
of health conditions and usage of disability pensions. Yet, according to both criteria 2% of the sam-
ple are benefit recipients whose health is not that bad in comparison with the rest of population, 
while 11% of surveyed respondents do not receive disability benefits despite of having worse actual 
health conditions than some of the recipients. In terms of potential system abuse (or maybe just in-
efficiency of benefit allocation) these figures mean that health conditions of around half of the dis-
ability benefits recipients are not any worse than some of those who refuse from participation in the 
system. Altogether, mismatches amount to over 13% of the sample.  
 
Fig. 4. Estimated abstinence and abuse rates for different criteria threshold values 
Table 8. Inconsistencies in benefit allocation (% to the adult sample, composite results on all criteria) 
Weak criterion Strong criterion 
Self-reported health conditions Self-reported health conditions 
 
Healthy Disabled Healthy Disabled 
Healthy 84.4 11.3 84.1 11.7 
Status in the system Disabled 2.4 1.8 2.1 2.2 
Further consideration of inconsistencies computed for different age and gender groups provide addi-
tional results (Table 9). The boundaries between healthy and disabled gradually disappear with age: 
the share of consistently disabled people amounts to 97–98% in the youngest age group but later 
drops significantly (up to 40 points decrease). This decrease is followed by simultaneous shift to 
other groups: in particular, the number of refusing individuals grows reflecting general deterioration 
of health with age. The most remarkable case is represented by women after retirement age: the 
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shares of consistently healthy and refusing take very close values on weak criterion, resulting most 
likely from voluntary choice between various sources of social security support at comparable 
health status. More interesting, the distribution of disability pension recipients also changes with 
age. When still relatively young, the number of abusers exceeds the number of consistently dis-
abled; it is usually after retirement that the relationship in most cases reverses. When applying weak 
criterion, a remarkable increase in abusing rates is found for both genders in pre-retirement age: this 
is where maximum abuse rates are found.  
Table 9. Inconsistencies in benefit allocation by age/gender groups 
Age/gender group Consistently healthy Refusing Abusing 
Consistently 
disabled 
Weak criterion 
age 40– 97.02 0.70 1.86 0.41 
age40–55(60) 89.12 2.95 5.59 2.33 
Men 
age55(60)+ 64.10 25.71 3.23 6.96 
age 40– 96.56 1.66 1.55 0.22 
age40–55(60) 88.14 7.21 2.93 1.71 
Women 
age55(60)+ 53.54 41.43 1.59 3.44 
Strong criterion 
age 40– 96.23 1.49 1.57 0.70 
age40–55(60) 82.67 9.40 3.57 4.35 
Men 
age55(60)+ 77.52 12.30 5.22 4.97 
age 40– 92.83 5.40 1.18 0.59 
age40–55(60) 68.21 27.14 1.29 3.36 
Women 
age55(60)+ 71.59 23.39 2.38 2.65 
These findings suggest that some factors other than merely health conditions determine individual 
status in the system of disability benefits. Appendix A1 provides descriptive statistics for selected 
variables on representatives of the four groups that to be used in empirical part of the paper. All 
variables are discussed in more details in the next section of the paper.  
5. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
5.1. Model specification  
The next step is to seek some explanation for identified inconsistencies through investigation of the 
factors that influence the probability of an individual in better health to search for disability bene-
fits, or the probability of the one suffering limitations in the daily activities due to the poor health to 
refrain from application for the social assistance. Two types of models were estimated with the fol-
lowing purposes: 
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• logit models to estimate the impact of personal and social characteristics on the probability of 
an individual to belong to a specific type of disabled population — recipients of state disability 
pensions, self-reported disability, or state of health measured on weak and strong criteria; 
• multinomial logit model to estimate the impact of personal and social characteristics on the 
probability of belonging to different groups in terms of compliance or inconsistencies between 
the status in the disability system and health conditions. 
Three versions of logit model differ only in dependent variable y denoting belonging of an individ-
ual to one of the three types of disabled population, otherwise the models take the following form:  
 P(y = 1 | x) = G (β0 + x β), (5) 
where G is logistic function, β — vector of estimated parameters. Vector of explanatory variables x 
includes a set of individual, household and settlement characteristics that are discussed below.  
The first set of suggested individual characteristics that are expected to influence the probability to 
belong to disabled population is rather typical for this type of studies: it includes dummies for age 
groups (same as used in Section 4.3, senior group used as omitted category), gender, marital status 
and education level (the highest grade completed at school and dummy variable for higher educa-
tion).  
The level of income is presumably a relevant variable; however, since current personal income is 
expected to be endogenous, historical levels of income in the previous year and back in 1990 are 
used to estimate the level of pre-application income for individuals who are currently classified as 
disabled. In addition, dummies corresponding to self-reported primary occupation in the previous 
period of the survey (disabled, unemployed, retired and not working for other reasons) with omitted 
category "employed" are introduced to control for development of individual status in the labor 
market.  
Two variables are included to account for health conditions of individuals in the sample. The first 
one is a dummy variable taking non-zero values for individuals who reported suffering from any 
chronic disease, including in particular diseases of heart, lung, liver and kidney, gastrointestinal dis-
ease, spinal problems, stumps or other chronic illness. An additional health related variable is smok-
ing. Similarly to the personal income, smoking in the current period is presumably endogenous, 
therefore having an experience of smoking ever in the respondent's life is taken into account as a 
proxy for this factor. 
The next set of variables covers characteristics of a household. The size of the household is meas-
ured by the number of people in it, meaning the number of people living together and having 
common income and expenditures, as well as children younger than 18 who are studying away 
from the household. The number of dependents is estimated by the number of respondent's own or 
officially adopted children under age 16. Household assets are approximated by the estimated 
market value of currently occupied residence, and the current level of income is taken into con-
sideration as total per capita income of other household members, excluding personal income of 
any given respondent.  
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The characteristics of population center where a household resides are described by the following 
set of variables. First of all, settlement size is measured by the variable popul — estimated popula-
tion as reported by local authorities. In addition, two dummies are used to control for settlement 
type: regional administrative center (settype1) or other city (settype2), omitted category includes 
rural settlements. 
Multinomial logit model (Greene, 2003) was used to investigate the factors affecting behavior of 
complying, abusing and refusing groups of individuals in the system of state disability benefits. The 
choice between available options is considered as unordered multinomial response. Dependent vari-
able y takes four values corresponding to a set of mutually exclusive choices between statuses in the 
system: 0 — consistently healthy, 1 — refusing, 2 — abusing, 3 — consistently disabled. The base 
category is being consistently healthy.  
A vector of conditioning variables 23,1 =×∈ KKx  (the first element of x being equal to 1) in-
cludes the same personal demographic, occupational, household and population center characteris-
tics as logit models. Dummy controlling for chronic diseases was omitted from this model as it is 
highly correlated with other variables that were used in the construction of dependent variable when 
estimating the actual state of individual health.  
Two new variables were included into this model to evaluate the impact of available infrastructure 
and established interactions with the system of health care. First, accessibility of medical aid in the 
area was measured by the average time required for the members of the household to travel to the 
medical institution when they had to see health worker last time. When these measures were not 
available from the current survey round, a proxy — same variable available from the most recent 
round of survey — was used to reduce the number of missing observations. Since RLMS does not 
follow mobility of the respondents beyond the limits of the current population center, we assume 
that the distances remained valid over 5 years time period. Second, potential willingness to abuse 
the system was supposed to be correlated with establishes practice of interactions with the medical 
personnel. Therefore, another variable that was introduced to capture disposition of a respondent to 
corrupt behavior leading to the system abuse was experience of paying for received medical help 
with informal gifts or money given directly to the personnel of medical institution avoiding cashier.  
Response probabilities in multinomial logit model are defined as 
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Descriptive statistics for full sample and specific behavior patterns is shown in Appendix A1. The 
following discussion of sample mean values is mainly based on the comparison of aggregate means 
and groups defined with help of the weak criterion; conclusions on the differences arising when us-
ing strong criterion can be made directly from the table of means. Out of 10,066 adults aged over 16 
available in the sample, 7,194 are consistently healthy, 2,433 refuse from participation, 127 abuse 
the system, and 312 are consistently disabled. 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
26
Males constitute 43% of the total sample. Comparing to the aggregate sample average, the lowest 
share of men is found among refusing respondents (24%), while the highest is seen among abusers 
(57%). Average sample age is 44 years, due to the exclusion of individuals under than 16 years old. 
Refusing and consistently disabled individuals are noticeably older than those in the two groups 
with better health conditions. Married people represent 62% of the sample, with the highest share of 
marriages in consistently healthy group. Remarkably, the share of divorced and never married indi-
viduals is the highest among those individuals who were classified as system abusers, being about 
twice as high as among consistently disabled people. Healthy complying individuals are on average 
more educated than representatives of other groups (they are the only group to have over 9 years of 
schooling and above 80% of the group members with higher education), and they are more likely to 
have young children. Health conditions across groups in general correspond to the expectations: the 
majority of people with chronic diseases, anatomical deficiencies or self-reported disabilities are 
found outside consistently healthy group. 
To understand the situation with current income, all individual income excluding the amount of dis-
ability pension is shown for different groups. In 2002, this value amounted to 2200 rubles, with 
roughly 10% increase comparing to the previous year. Consistently healthy group gains the highest 
personal incomes, and positions of other groups have deteriorated comparing to the previous period. 
Average per capita income of other household members is lower — only 1352 rubles; maximum 
income is also registered in the households of consistently healthy individuals, but the difference 
across groups is much lower. In terms of other household features, population in poor health (con-
sistently disabled and refusing) live in smaller and less wealthy households. Representatives of dif-
ferent groups also demonstrate systematic distinctions in the lagged labor market status, complying 
with discussion on transition between different options that was provided in Section 4.2. 
Abusing individuals are less frequently residing in regional administrative centers, concentrating 
more in the cities with fewer population and rural settlements, while descriptive statistics does not 
show a lot of specific differences among other groups. Consistently disabled individuals visibly 
surpass population average in terms of the settlement size: this is the only group to be found on av-
erage in a city with more than 1.5 million people, in 49% a regional center.  
Estimated transaction costs of seeing a health worker (average time required to travel to a medical 
institution) are lower for complying groups (both healthy and disabled), and the highest value is 
registered for the group of refusing, supporting hypothesis on the inverse relationship between ac-
cessibility of the system and willingness to participate. On the opposite, the rates of informal pay-
ment for medical services are 30% higher for non-complying groups (both refusing and abusing), in 
line with hypothesis on willingness to pay trying to enter the system when eligibility is not obvious. 
5.2. Estimation results 
Tables in Appendix A2 and A3 provide elasticities at mean values from maximum likelihood esti-
mation of the models (Appendix A2 for logit and Appendix A3 for multinomial logit models). Es-
timation of logit models shows that regardless of adopted definition disability risk has a long mem-
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ory: regardless of taken definition of disability, it is consistently higher for individuals who used to 
be disabled or retired in the previous period. Unlike expected, unemployment in the previous period 
does not influence significantly the current ability of individual, even when difference is made be-
tween unemployment and non-participation. Disability is also closely related to health conditions: 
in all cases it is more likely for individuals suffering from chronic diseases, although smoking ex-
perience seems to be irrelevant.  
The impact of income level is not pronounced: income history dating back to 1990 is insignificant 
in all models (possible due to recollection error), as is the household wealth. Income of other 
household members only has a positive slightly significant impact for the recipients of state disabil-
ity benefits, not allowing to link application benefits to poverty at the level of household. Yet, at 
individual level lag of personal income reduces the probability of self-reporting disability and dis-
ability measured by health conditions on weak criterion.  
Other household features — both size of the household and having under age children — reduce the 
likelihood of health-related disability (both factors are significant fro weak criterion, children 
dummy — for strong as well). Self-reported and weak health related disability rates increase with 
the size of the population center, while the type of settlement is not necessarily important. The prob-
ability of health-related disabilities (both criteria) is lower in urban settlements that do not play the 
leading administrative role comparing to rural areas.  
The impact of demographic variables differs significantly from what might be expected from intui-
tive understanding of disability. The central problem occurs with age coefficients. Natural deteriora-
tion of health conditions with age suggests that the model coefficients should be negative to account 
for increased risk of disability among older people. However, the only case when this intuitive sug-
gestion finds empirical support is the model for heath-related disability (weak criterion). In all other 
models age coefficients are highly significant, yet positive, with the highest absolute values for 
middle-aged group. Potential explanation that can be provided for the first two models — those us-
ing receipt of disability benefits and self-reporting as dependent variables — can be searched for 
directly in the way the left hand side of the models was specified. In both cases we can suspect that 
whatever we measure as a dependent variable reflects not that much health-related disability, but 
individual status in the system. As older people have more options to choose from when answering 
these questions (different types of retirement, non-participation, etc.), the rates of physical disability 
as such may be reduced for this group, while younger people may be found in the group both be-
cause of health conditions and system abuse. The latter question will be examined in more details 
when multinomial logit models are discussed. Another option available for clarification of age issue 
could be to estimate separate models for different age groups, however it is not implemented here 
due to the limited number of complete observations among young people.  
The impact of gender is also different depending on the specification of dependent variable: state 
disability pensions are more likely to be granted to men, while health-related approaches show that 
women are more likely to loose regular ability because of health reasons. Higher education turned 
out to be irrelevant, and years of schooling influence negatively the risk of health-related disability 
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for both criteria. Marital status, when significant (in all cases but self-reporting) reduces the likeli-
hood of disability.  
To summarize the discussion of logit models estimation, it is seen that the results are substantially 
different and in some cases even contradictory depending on the definition of disabled population. 
These findings suggest that disability officially recognized by assignment of state pension may 
reflect a variety of issues in addition to the state of health alone. An attempt to distinguish be-
tween different types of disabled population within this broader category is made by estimation of 
multinomial logit model based on comparison between official recognition and reported state of 
health.  
Estimation results are summarized in form of elasticities in Appendix A3. Similar to the models es-
timating overall probability of disability, the only factor that consistently differentiates healthy in-
dividuals from those somehow attributed to disabled population (either based on health conditions, 
or benefit assignment) is individual status in the previous period: experience of disability or being 
in retirement increases the likelihood of true or officially recognized disability in the current period. 
In addition, unlike expected, being registered as unemployed in the previous round of the survey 
actually decreases the likelihood of system abuse. Therefore, based on obtained estimation results 
we don't have any reasons to suggest that the system of disability benefits is widely regarded as an 
option of income extraction by individuals unsuccessful in search of regular employment. Apart 
from unemployment status, the economic well-being plays an important role only for consistently 
disabled individuals. Consistent disability is inversely related to the lag of personal non-pension in-
come, as is abstinence (though at least at twice lower magnitude and only for weak approach). 
However, there is some positive compensating relationship between consistent disability and per 
capita income of other people in the household.  
Abstinence is unexpectedly lower for the members of small households, not reflecting higher need 
for assistance among individuals living alone or with fewer people that can contribute to the house-
hold budgets. All groups linked to the problem of disability have fewer children than consistently 
healthy ones, which might be a reflection of causality problem in case of refusing and consistently 
disabled. Consistently disabled are also less likely to be married, probably for the same reason.  
Refusing individuals in the weak model are younger, while all other groups are in general older than 
consistently healthy. Men are more frequent among consistently disabled and abusing, while 
women tend to refuse. Education is lower among refusing group, indicating potential problems with 
dissemination of accessible information on available benefits among less educated groups of popu-
lation.  
Time variable capturing travel distance to the medical centers does not have significant impact in 
any case. However, abstinence rates increase with population but are lower for non-administrative 
urban centers, suggesting that both overpopulated areas and urban settlements with lack of infra-
structure can be problematic for successful applications. Corruption variable has a positive influ-
ence for most of the groups; yet this finding may be associated with higher rates of visits to the 
medical institutions by people with real or simulated health problems.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper was aimed at the investigation of targeting in the system of disability benefits in Russia. 
Three approaches were suggested to identify disabled population from RLMS survey: recipients of 
state disability benefits, self-reported disabled and disabled based on health-related measurements. 
Two methods were introduced to estimate health of the respondents from survey data, referred to as 
weak and strong approaches. Accuracy of targeting was evaluated based on comparison of individ-
ual status in the system of disability benefits and health conditions. Four possible states were identi-
fied from these comparisons: complying healthy and disabled, refusing and abusing.  
Apparently, the social security system currently fails to provide the benefits to the target group of 
population, instead covering numerous individuals with scarce benefits. The situation might im-
prove from the introduction of more strict entry barriers and increase of the real amount of benefits 
obtained; however, such policy would require a deep understanding of the underlying processes of 
individual decision making and behavioral responses. 
Descriptive analysis of the data revealed significant inconsistencies in the targeting of disability 
benefits. It has basically shown that there were no significant differences in the health status of the 
recipients of disability pensions and those who do not apply for social security benefits. Two sets of 
models were estimated to analyze the factors (especially those not related to the health) that define 
individual status in the system and decisions of incompliance and refusing. 
Estimation results have shown that the status in disability system is very sensitive to the health condi-
tions and is characterized with a long memory: the fact of being disabled or retired in the previous pe-
riod plays the most important role in the current system participation. Investigation of the system of 
disability benefits in Russia and empirical study of disability benefits targeting have supported an ex-
istence of trade-off between disability and retirement. It was initially suggested that a similar trade-off 
may exist between disability and unemployment, however empirical estimation has shown that unem-
ployment does not contribute to falsified disability, and even inverse situation may take place.  
Based on the identified relationship between disability and retirement, we can say that disability 
benefits play a distorting role and substitute for early retirement. Introduction of means-tested sys-
tem at least for the part of benefits that is not funded on insurance principles, as well as introduction 
of policies that encourage people with disabilities to work and to stop paying benefits once some 
level of income is achieved might correct this problem.  
It has been shown that non-participation is associated with lower levels of education. This outcome 
implies the need to simplify existing application procedures and to improve the flows of informa-
tion in the system for the benefit of less educated individuals. Emphasis on disability policies that 
are aimed at provision of accommodation for disabled to work, development of infrastructure, reha-
bilitation measures (including psychological adjustment) rather than just monetary benefits can also 
be beneficial for this group. These measures would provide disabled population with more options 
to get sufficient income and would reduce the psychological and social burden of being disabled. As 
a result, the rate of applications for disability benefits would fall, the remaining amount would al-
low to increase payments to the fewer severely disabled individuals.  
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APPENDICES 
A1. Definition of variables and mean values 
Weak criterion Strong criterion 
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Individual properties 
Age Age: continuous (years) 43.8 36.8 62.8 42.3 58.3 41.2 57.9 51.0 56.3 
Age1  Age dummy: 1 = between 16  
and 40 0.47 0.61 0.07 0.45 0.12 0.53 0.14 0.30 0.14 
Age2 Age dummy: 1 = between 41 and 
statutory retirement age (55 
females, 60 males) 0.27 0.28 0.21 0.42 0.37 0.24 0.41 0.30 0.46 
Age3 Age dummy: 1 = after statutory 
retirement age 0.27 0.11 0.72 0.13 0.51 0.23 0.45 0.40 0.40 
Gender  Gender dummy: 1 = male 0.43 0.48 0.24 0.57 0.52 0.45 0.21 0.57 0.50 
Married Marital status: 1 — married 
(registered or unregistered 
marriage) 0.62 0.66 0.52 0.53 0.58 0.64 0.53 0.58 0.54 
Divorced Marital status: 1 — divorced 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.13 
Widow Marital status: 1 — widow(er) 0.13 0.05 0.36 0.07 0.23 0.09 0.34 0.15 0.21 
Nevmar Marital status: 1 — never married 0.17 0.22 0.04 0.26 0.10 0.19 0.06 0.19 0.10 
Grdlev  
Highest grade level achieved as 
school  9.11 9.57 7.83 8.99 8.39 9.30 7.96 8.80 8.33 
Highsc  Higher education dummy 0.73 0.81 0.52 0.70 0.60 0.76 0.58 0.68 0.58 
Occupation and income history 
Income Current personal income 
(excluding disability pension), 
2002  2200.3 2746.9 920.6 797.8 305.3 2402.4 1438.7 608.5 288.4
Inc90 Estimated salary in 1990 (rub.) 293 302 268 323 288 294 279 267 328 
Income_l Lag of personal income (excluding 
disability pension), 2001 1984.2 2230.6 1533.6 727.2 601.4 2096.5 1702.4 750.4 532.2
occup_lag1 Occupation lag (2001): worked 0.50 0.61 0.25 0.29 0.15 0.54 0.39 0.24 0.14 
occup_lag2 Occupation lag (2001): studied 0.09 0.12 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.01 
occup_lag3 Occupation lag (2001): disabled 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.01 0.25 0.36 
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occup_lag4 Occupation lag (2001): 
unemployed 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.03 
occup_lag5 Occupation lag (2001): retired 0.25 0.09 0.67 0.19 0.49 0.21 0.47 0.37 0.43 
occup_lag6 Occupation lag (2001):  
did not work for other reasons 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.03 
Health 
Reaschron Dummy: 1 = suffers from  
at least 1 chronic disease 0.49 0.37 0.78 0.73 0.90 0.43 0.77 0.81 0.89 
Reasanat Dummy: 1 = anatomic defects, 
leg/arm absent 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Selfrep Main occupation — unable to 
work, disabled 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.31 0.30 0.00 0.02 0.25 0.36 
Smoked Dummy: 1 = has ever smoked 0.47 0.53 0.27 0.60 0.45 0.49 0.31 0.51 0.47 
Household properties 
Num Number of household members 3.33 3.54 2.73 3.53 2.90 3.39 2.97 3.16 3.01 
Mvalue Estimated market value of 
occupied residence (thousand rub.) 310 319 287 257 271 314 292 274 259 
Hhincpc Per capita income of other 
household members  1351.7 1465.5 1057.5 1144.1 1183.6 1387.7 1172.6 1186.3 1158.4
Child Number of own children  
under 16 y.o. 0.41 0.53 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.46 0.20 0.20 0.14 
Settlement properties 
Popul  Settlement population (thousand) 1,388 1,310 1,577 1,034 1,859 1,393 1,265 1,785 1,463
Settype1 Regional center 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.35 0.49 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.48 
Settype2 City 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.27 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.23 0.21 
Settype3  Village 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.38 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.34 0.31 
Healthcare system 
Trvtime Estimated time required to visit a 
doctor 68.92 66.93 96.33 92.06 68.88 65.31 89.95 96.67 68.92
Corrup Dummy: 1 = has paid for obtained 
medical services directly to the 
personnel 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.06 
 
Number of observations 10,066 7,194 2,433 127 312 8,413 1,214 215 224 
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A2. Determinants of belonging to disabled population: elasticities after logit estimation 
Dependent variable (category of disabled population = 1) 
Explanatory variables Recipients of 
disability pension 
Self-reported 
disabled 
Disabled by weak 
criterion 
Disabled by strong 
criterion 
Individual properties 
age1 0.3048 *** 0.4902 ** –0.2698 *** 0.2079 *** 
age2 0.8240 *** 1.4304 *** –0.2154 *** 0.9450 *** 
Gender 0.5520 *** –0.1288  –0.1596 *** –0.3938 *** 
Married –0.4370 ** 0.4373  –0.1958 ** –0.2392 ** 
Grdlev 0.1984  –0.4321  –1.1528 *** –1.5034 *** 
Highsc 0.3276  0.0472  –0.1289  0.1760  
Occupation and income history 
inc90 –0.0692  –0.0779  0.0031  0.0100  
incomeind_l –0.1774  –0.9473 ** –0.2767 *** –0.1036  
occup_lag3 (disabled) 0.0888 *** 0.0947 *** 0.0348 *** 0.0388 *** 
occup_lag4 (unemployed) 0.0162  0.0207  0.0061  0.0096  
occup_lag5 (retired) 0.5167 *** 0.3975 *** 0.1729 *** 0.2198 *** 
occup_lag6 (not working  
for other reasons) 0.0201  0.0816 * 0.0156  0.0151  
Health 
Reaschron 1.0067 *** 0.7850 *** 0.5236 *** 0.5840 *** 
Smoked –0.0705  0.2534  –0.0738  0.0702  
Household properties 
Num 0.2721  –0.0072  –0.2369 ** 0.0652  
Child –0.0807  –0.0307  –0.1504 *** –0.1377 *** 
Mvalue –0.1165  –0.1939  0.0065  –0.0073  
Hhinothpc 0.1213 * 0.0531  0.0350  0.0392  
Settlement properties 
Popul –0.0061  0.1410 *** 0.0663 *** –0.0245  
settype1 –0.0105  –0.1114  –0.0579  –0.0138  
settype2 0.0083  0.0145  –0.0693 ** –0.1067 *** 
Number of observations 2631  2631  2631  2631  
Pseudo R2 0.3065  0.4448  0.3053  0.1764  
Wald Chi2 201.87  174.58  600.65  310.78  
Prob>chi2(22) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Note: *** / ** / * — estimate statistically significant at 1 /5 / 10% level. 
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A3. Determinants of individual behavior in the system of state disability benefits:  
elasticities after multinomial logit estimation 
Inconsistencies (weak criterion) Inconsistencies (strong criterion) 
Explanatory 
variables Refusing Abusing Consistently disabled Refusing Abusing 
Consistently 
disabled 
Individual properties 
age1 –0.3434 *** 0.4735 * 0.0900   0.1302 ** 0.1315   0.3119 * 
age2 –0.3521 *** 1.2545 *** 0.6070 *** 0.8170 *** 0.5428 ** 1.3101 *** 
gender –0.2716 *** 0.5396   0.5799 *** –0.4719 *** 0.9811 *** 0.0687   
married –0.0729   –0.0529   –0.6143 ** –0.1689   –0.4097   –0.5626 ** 
grdlev –0.8184 ** 0.9168   –0.6113   –1.3128 ** 1.2249   –1.0496   
highsc –0.2932 *** –0.4118   0.5145   0.0909   0.0622   0.5153   
Occupation and income history 
inc90 0.0550   0.0986   –0.1776   –0.0245   –0.3265   0.1019   
incomeind_l –0.2593 *** –0.1180   –0.5911 ** –0.0650   –0.2207   –0.6044 ** 
occup_lag3 
(disabled) 0.0295 ** 0.1032 *** 0.1196 *** 0.0373 *** 0.1012 *** 0.1243 *** 
occup_lag4 
(unemployed) 0.0109   –0.9146 *** 0.0317   0.0096   0.0388   0.0110   
occup_lag5 
(retired) 0.1490 *** 0.3227 ** 0.5597 *** 0.1733 *** 0.4019 *** 0.6045 *** 
occup_lag6  
(not working 
for other 
reasons) 0.0225   0.0520   –0.0492   0.0186   0.0314   –0.0383   
Health care 
trvtime –0.0426   0.0349   0.0529   –0.0212   –0.0144   0.0817   
corrup 0.0271 * 0.0717 * 0.0740 ** 0.0445 *** 0.0234   0.0987 *** 
smoked –0.0163   0.0282   –0.1791   0.0208   –0.2765   0.1982   
Household properties 
num –0.4027 *** 0.4032   0.0570   –0.1568   0.2150   0.2004   
child –0.1584 *** –0.3701 ** –0.1459   –0.1294 ** –0.2220 * –0.2859 ** 
mvalue 0.0588   0.0260   –0.1252   –0.0502   –0.2121   0.0387   
hhinot~c 0.0104   –0.0422   0.1280 * 0.0068   0.0502   0.1330 * 
Settlement properties 
popul 0.0627 ** –0.0315   0.0060   0.0123   0.0089   –0.0489   
settype1 –0.0775   –0.0883   0.1116   –0.0117   0.0545   0.0886   
settype2 –0.0615 * 0.0887   0.0291   –0.0760 * 0.1076   –0.0129   
Number of 
observations 2094 2094 
Pseudo R2 0.2885 0.1909 
Wald Chi2 19918.46 447.41 
Prob>chi2(22) 0.0000 0.0000 
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